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**MOVEMENT FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES
AND DEMOCRACY TO RWANDA (RDR)
Cameroon Wing**

RG209785

**UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MISLED ABOUT THE
PRESUMED "TUTSI GENOCIDE" IN RWANDA**

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SUMMARY

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INTRODUCTION

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On 6 April 1994, the plane in which President Juvénal HABYARIMANA was travelling with the President of Burundi, Cyprien NTARYAMIRA, was shot down as it was about to land at the Grégoire KAYIBANDA International airport.

The media and the International Community remained silent over that assassination. On the contrary, the tragic events that ensued the next day were given ample coverage and disseminated across the world.

On 7 April 1994 in the evening, RFI, BBC, Canal Afrique and other international media had already announced that 500,000 Tutsis had just been killed. Since that date, and irrespective of the fact that the war and massacres continued till 15 July 1994, the number of victims hardly varied.

There is every reason to believe that the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) first contacted the media and convinced them to provide media cover by spreading the RPF version of the events and playing down or completely ignoring the information furnished by their adversaries.

This explains why the international media unexpectedly took the RPF propaganda for granted and dared describe massacres that were committed in a single day, i.e. 7 April 1994, as "genocide". Thus the use of the word "genocide" was born of a campaign expertly orchestrated by the RPF and its allies to gain all the sympathy of the international community in a war they resumed and which they saw as a final solution.

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The word "genocide" gives one the shivers; it immediately arouses widespread disapproval and an overwhelming urge for repression. The word "genocide" warrants prompt, concrete measures that are supposed to yield visible results against the perpetrators of that "genocide". This therefore generates instinctive coalition and sympathy for the victims.

In the case of Rwanda, the number of victims immediately grew, and macabre pictures were projected on the screens. Photographs were published on cover pages with captions indicating that the victims were Tutsis... All this was intended to forge a spirit of solidarity with the Tutsis throughout the world, while whipping up a sentiment of reprobation towards the Hutus.

This explains why even its most loyal allies and long-standing friends abandoned a Republic founded by GREGOIRE KAYIBANDA. They refrained from supporting it for fear of being labelled allies of the ("genocide perpetrators"). This in turn justifies the aid that the international community kept extending to the RPF to win the war and repress the genocide perpetrators, wherever they might be.

It is in this context that the President of the Human Rights Commission appointed a Special Rapporteur on Rwanda. His mandate was "to report, *inter alia*, on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, including the root causes and responsibilities".

Even though the truth lay elsewhere, the Special Rapporteur, René Degni Segui, for reasons yet unclear, presented his report No. E/CN.4/1995/7 of 28 June 1994, affirming that:

- Following the assassination of President HABYARIMANA, massacres had occurred in Rwanda;
- The massacres had been planned and were directed against the Tutsis;
- There was well and truly a "Tutsi genocide";
- The State organs and political parties had been the pillars of that "genocide"; and

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The RTL (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) and the Interahamwe had been identified as the instruments of that "genocide".

It was as a sequel to those affirmations that the International Community [headed by the United States and Belgium] considered the Hutu population, political officials and intellectuals anathema. It was also after this that the RPF and its organs were considered the only force capable and worthy of henceforth leading Rwanda.

However, critics ought to have appraised the situation and understood that far from being the truth, the "Tutsi genocide" in Rwanda was an alibi or a trump card used to gain power finally, with the approval of the International Community.

To confirm this assertion, this document will show the lack of objectivity of the Degni Report, in an effort to prove that it was impossible to plan the "Tutsi genocide" and identify the real perpetrators and those responsible for the massacres.

1. NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF THE MASSACRES

The clashes that erupted directly after the assassination of President HABYARIMANA are qualified as "genocide" where the killings were perpetrated by the Hutus and as mere murders when committed by Tutsis against Hutus. This is the conviction of Special Reporter René Degni Segui when he affirms, without beating about the bush, that:

- a. The people of Rwanda had already been victims of several massacres, notably, in 1959, 1963, 1967, 1972, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993 and that those massacres have always been directed at the Tutsi minority (10%).
- b. The number of victims, generally of the Tutsi minority, is estimated at approximately 200,000 and 500,000; that some sources advance the figure of 1,000,000 victims; and that in any event, the accurate number will never be known.
- c. Some Hutus were killed either by the Hutu "extremists" where they were considered "moderates", or by the RPF which took them for "extremists".
- d. The causes of the massacres in Rwanda are principally due to the rejection of alternate political power, incitement to ethnic hate and violence, and lastly, impunity.

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The aforementioned points figure in paragraphs 18 to 28, 49, and 55 to 61 of the aforementioned René Degni Segui Report.

1.1 Origin of the inter-ethnic massacres prior to 1994

The way in which the massacres before 1994 are presented reveals that the Special Rapporteur is not conversant with the social, political and historic realities of Rwanda and that his report was compiled on the basis of information furnished by persons who were implicated in the conflict. Otherwise, he would have noted that those massacres had always stemmed from extremism, arrogance and murderous provocation by certain members of the Tutsi population as evidenced by the following historical events:

1959 - Chief MBONYUMUTWA was molested by the Tutsis in Biyimana, Gitarama. The Hutu uprising was swift and spontaneous, and ended in the 1959 social Revolution.

1963 - Counter-revolutionary attacks by the Tutsis in the Diaspora occasioned several deaths among the Hutu civilian population, which provoked ethnic insecurity within the country.

1967 - A repetition of the 1963 events.

1973 - A wave of ethnic insecurity as a reaction to the assassination of 300,000 Burundian Hutus by the Tutsi monolithic Army in 1972.

When a group of Tutsi exiles, members of the Ugandan Army, attacked Rwanda from Mutara after 17 years of peace, it was only President HABYARIMANA who knew how to quell the anger, contain and temper the reaction of the majority population made up essentially of Hutus (90%).

The trouble that occurred in October 1990 ought to have been interpreted as isolated cases of excesses in response to incidents initiated by the RPF. Thus, in:

1990 - Inter-ethnic disturbances erupted in Mutara following an attack by the RPF from that region, on 1 October 1990.

1991 - Spontaneous disturbances erupted in response to the expeditious attacks mounted by the RPF against Ruhengeri town and which occasioned the loss of life among the Hutu civilian population.

1992 - There was a wave of ethnic insecurity in Bugesera as a result of the large-scale recruitment of Tutsi youths into the RPF, followed by acts of sabotage in the region.

1993 - A wave of inter-ethnic insecurity swept across Gishyita - Kibuye, following the large-scale drafting of Tutsi youths into the RPF and the attendant systematic insubordination against established authority.

1.2 The number of victims in the last massacres

While affirming that the exact number of victims will never be known, the Special Rapporteur advances a number ranging from 200,000 to 500,000. On the contrary, he retains the figure of 1,000,000. Here, René Degni Segui fails to indicate the source of those figures with a margin of error ranging from 200% to 500%. He does not wonder about the method used to arrive at those figures, nor does he indicate the means deployed to know the ethnic origin of each victim.

It is very alarming to note that the Special Rapporteur never thought of proposing to the United Nations Security Council to do all in its power to ascertain the number of victims. Before advancing imaginary figures and imposing the lax theory of "Tutsi genocide", the Security Council ought to have effectively ascertained the exact number of victims from each ethnic group.

It may be worthwhile pointing out to the Security Council that there is no major obstacle in determining the number of victims insofar as the following data is available:

- a. the population of Rwanda (domestic and Diaspora) in 1992;
- b. the annual population growth rate;
- c. the theoretical population of Rwanda in 1996;
- d. the actual population of Rwanda in 1996.

The fact that the RPF Government and/or the International Community did not speedily undertake to clarify the number of those victims calls for the following comments:

- a. Supposing the number of victims were deliberately inflated for purposes of propaganda, the International Community would never accept that the real figure be established in order not to prove the alleged "perpetrators" of the genocide right. The alleged perpetrators have always held that there was no "genocide in Rwanda, but rather inter-ethnic massacres.

b. The RPF Government will likewise not approve the scheme for obvious reasons:

- Once the real figure is established, it may turn out that the greater number of victims were from the accused ethnic group, meaning the Hutus;
- Knowledge of the accurate number of Rwandans in the country may reveal that the RPF Government had control only over a small fraction of the population; which would hardly justify the assistance granted to it.

Similarly, the fact of publishing the exact number of Rwandans within the country would surely prevent the RPF from carrying out rampant genocide against the Hutus.

1.3 Category of Hutus assassinated

The Special Rapporteur acknowledges that there are also victims among the Hutus [a fact that belies the existence of genocide] and adds that the Hutus were killed either by the RPF, since they were extremists, or by the *Interahamwe* who accused them of being "moderates". Here, the fundamental problem is how does one recognize a "Hutu extremist" or a "moderate Hutu"? In what category does one classify the Hutus killed by the RPF and who are listed hereunder:

1. Archbishop Vincent NSENGIYUMVA of Kigali;
2. Bishop Thadée NSENGIYUMVA of Kabgayi and President of the Bishops Conference in Rwanda;
3. Bishop Joseph RUZINDANA of Byumba;
4. Sylvestre BARIYANGA, *Préfet* of Ruhengeri;
5. Emmanuel HITAYEZU, former Minister in the KAYIBANDA Government, on retirement;
6. Claudien HABARUSHAKA, former *Préfet* of Kigali turned International Consultant;
7. Emmanuel BAHIGIKI, former Secretary General in the Ministry of Economic Planning turned International Consultant;
8. Charles MBABAJENDE, President of the Human Rights Association in Rwanda;

9. Dismas GASHEGU, former Vice-Rector of the Rwanda National University;
10. Marcel MUNYANGABE, former President of the Audit Court turned President of SOS Orphans;
11. Révérien, President of the supreme Council for the Magistrature;
12. Father Alexis HAVUGIMANA, a priest in Byumba Diocese;
13. Father Athanase NKUNDABANYANGA, a priest in Byumba Diocese;
14. Father Christian NKIRIYEHE, a priest in Byumba Diocese;
15. Father Joseph HITIMANA, a priest in Byumba Diocese and Rector of the Minor Seminary in Rwesero;
16. Father Ladislas MUHAYEMUNGU, a priest in Byumba Diocese;
17. Father Gaspard MUDASHIMWA, a priest in Byumba Diocese;

1.4 Causes of inter-ethnic massacres

1.4.1 Rejection of alternate political power

Generally speaking, it is true that the rejection of alternate political power often gives rise to violence. But in the specific case of Rwanda, the principle of alternate political power had already been adopted as evidenced by the following facts:

- a. Establishment of a National Commission by the President of the Republic on 24 September 1990, to propose political reforms within the national institutions;
- b. Adoption of a new Constitution on 10 June 1991, establishing multi party politics;
- c. Formation on 15 April 1992 of a coalition Government headed by a Prime Minister from the opposition;
- d. Signature of the Arusha accords by the President of the Republic on 3 August 1993;
- e. The appointment of opposition *Préfets* and Ambassadors;
- f. Organization of bye-elections in certain *communes*, notably in the so-called buffer zone.

In short, any alternate political power that did not put the 1959 Social Revolution to question was not only tolerated, but also advocated by some of the very people the Special Rapporteur was diabolizing.

It was rather the principle of alternating political power between the majority (90%) and a minority (10%) outside the ballot box, that is to say, political change through the barrel of the gun, which was rejected and will always be rejected.

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So, the political scientists and specialists on Rwanda will recall that when the Transitional Government was put in place in April 1992, the mission of the Prime Minister was to organize a sovereign national conference and free and fair elections. The task assigned to the Prime Minister, who was from the radical opposition [comprising the political parties that were adverse to cohabitation with the MRND, and which demanded especially the unconditional departure of President HABYARIMANA], was to organize a sovereign national conference and free and fair democratic elections.

That goal was never attained for the following reasons:

- a. The RPF was dead against it, because it had committed crimes against the Hutu civilians during its repeated attacks. And then there was the fact that the RPF could never win free and fair democratic elections, all the more so as the population considered the RPF leaders as officers of the Ugandan Army.
- b. The radical opposition within the country is not in a hurry to organize neither a sovereign national conference nor free and fair democratic elections because the leaders of the opposition, members of the Transitional Government soon became ineligible and prolongation of the period of transition was salutary.

Besides, critics who are interested in political developments in Rwanda affirm that between the MRND [*Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement*], the RPF and opposition parties, only the MDR [*Mouvement Démocratique Républicain*] could have posed a serious threat for the MRND. Table 4 shows that no member of its Executive Committee was perturbed.

1.4.2 Incitement to ethnic hatred and violence

In Paragraph 58 of his report, René Degni Segni states that according to false rumour, "The Tutsis are portrayed, for example, as "bloodthirsty, power-hungry and determined to impose their rule on the people of Rwanda by means of the gun".

All things considered, what is the falsehood in those rumours now that the whole world followed what happened in Kibeho, Kanama, Muramba and elsewhere under the RPF régime between 1995 and 1996?

Denouncing the danger constituted by the Tutsis regaining power by arms should not be tantamount to incitement to ethnic hatred and violence.

1.4.3 Impunity

It is true that impunity can encourage criminals to violate human rights. But the principle should apply to all perpetrators of crimes, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

It is undeniable that the RPF committed exaction, notably, by attacking Rwanda, killing and displacing the population, killing Hutu leaders, laying mines, killing the Bishops of Kabgayi and priests in Byumba. Even after the taking over power, the RPF continues to kill Hutus and the killers are not perturbed. There is reason to wonder why the Special Rapporteur does not denounce the impunity of RPF criminals as vehemently!

Do such manifest silence and this deliberate omission not imply that the RPF leaders, who are criminals, will not be prosecuted before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established by the United Nations for that purpose?

2. Evidence of unplanned massacres

According to the Special Rapporteur, the idea that the massacres were planned emerged from a body of clues identified as follows:

- a. the campaign of incitement to ethnic hatred and violence orchestrated by Radio Rwanda and the RTLM;
- b. the distribution of arms to the civilian population and intensive training undergone by members of the militia at military installations in 1993;
- c. the exceptional speed of events after President HABYARIMANA's death; for instance:
 - the setting up of the provisional Government within a few hours of the accident;
 - the setting up of roadblocks between 30 to 45 minutes after the plane crash, and even before the news had been announced on the national radio.
 - The existence of lists of persons to be executed.

In paragraph 64 of his report, the René Degni Segui affirms, and rightly so, "The attack on the presidential aircraft must be examined by the Special Rapporteur, to determine any links between those who ordered it and those responsible for the massacres". As a matter of fact, any search for the truth about the Rwandan tragedy should logically be along those lines. But, since it has not been established that it is the Hutu "extremists" who assassinated President HABYARIMANA, how and why should the Special Rapporteur dare accuse the Hutus of planning the massacres that ensued from that assassination?

Further more, the "alleged clues" that the massacres were planned do not indicate any seriousness, as can be seen hereunder:

- a. The campaign of incitement to ethnic hatred and violence orchestrated by Radio Rwanda and the RTLM would be a serious indication that the massacres were planned, if René Degni Segui had established that the heads of those two radio stations were aware of the plan to assassinate President HABYARIMANA.
- b. The distribution of arms to the civilian population and intensive training undergone by "militiamen" at military installations referred to by René Degni Segui is the fruit of pure imagination on the part of his informants, who are generally unreliable.

The reality is that from 1992, the Government decided to organize civil defence by reinforcing the police presence in the border *communes* which were constantly threatened or attacked by RPF armed gangs. Later, the arms that were distributed were withdrawn upon the orders of the Government shortly before the signing of the Arusha accords, at the request of the RPF. Notwithstanding, arms were once more distributed to the *commune* policemen in the same area, following the killing of Hutus around Kirambo and Mutara region.

The intensive training of *Interahamwe* militiamen referred to by the Special Rapporteur did not take place. As usual, René Degni Segui was once again misinformed deliberately by his hardly reliable informants, who misinformed him by distorting facts. The truth is that in 1993, the Ministry of Defence, like in the past, proceeded effectively to train a few hundred of youths for the *Office Rwandais du Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux* [Rwandan Board of Tourism and National Parks]. That Board was obliged to renew and increase the staff in the National Parks in the light of current needs, namely:

- Replacement of staff killed by the RPF during the war it was waging in the Akagera Park;
 - Increasing staffing as a result of insecurity and widespread poaching due to the war.
- c. The exceptional speed of a succession of events immediately after President HABYARIMANA's death can in no way constitute a serious indication of planned "genocide", for the following three reasons:

- The Interim Government was set up three days [and not a few hours] after the assassination of the Head of State. That government was formed on 9 April 1994. This is a historical fact that the Special Rapporteur ought to have verified. He should likewise have verified and realized that the government was set up in accordance with the Constitution of 10 June 1991 and the Draft Agreement on power-sharing of 15 April 1992. The said Draft Agreement was signed between the MRND, MDR, PSD [Social Democratic Party], the PL [Liberal party] and the PDC [Christian Democratic Party], while maintaining the spirit of the Arusha peace Accords.
- Before erecting the roadblocks, the forces of law and order did not have to wait for the announcement of the Head of State's assassination on the national radio, considering that it was only announced the next day, approximately 10 hours after the fact. Furthermore, no army in the world transmits its orders through the national media. Decidedly, the Specialist, René Degni Segui has much to learn about military Administration.

The fact that the forces of law and order took control of the town and erected roadblocks 30 to 45 minutes of the plane crash is nothing extraordinary. The country was still in a state of war and the army was still on alert. Then, the Presidential Guard had to be at the airport waiting for the President. In any event, given the size of Kigali town and the location of the military camps in the town, any military authority who failed to take measures within 45 minutes of the accident should have automatically worked himself out of his commission.

- d. In paragraph 26 on page 7 of his report, the Special Rapporteur announces lists with names of people to be executed. But no part of his report establishes the existence of such lists. Therefore, there is reason to affirm that René Degni Segui confines himself to mention the lists cursorily as if that alone sufficed to impute blame on a people and prove why those interethnic massacres took place.

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For the truth to triumph, and for the International Community to cease relying on a report that does not cite its sources, René Degni Segui must be urged to publish those ill-famed lists, mention their origin and say why he thinks they are reliable.

Like many other points we raised elsewhere in this document, the report displays a fair degree of weakness in providing proof and shows that it could not constitute the basis for a plausible decision on Rwanda.

3. Error in identification of targetted group

The Special Rapporteur points out that the Tutsi ethnic group was well and truly the group targetted in the massacres that followed the Head of State's assassination. He draws the inference from the existence of a "secret" document put out by the General Staff of the Rwandan Army, dated 21 September 1992, defining the main enemy and his supporters.

This military document states:

"The main enemy is the Tutsi within the country or abroad, an extremist nostalgic for power, who has never accepted and still does not accept the reality of the 1959 Social Revolution, and who wants to gain power in Rwanda by any means, including arms".

This definition means that the enemy is not ethnic, but rather political. It is a category of Tutsi, impelled by the intent to overthrow the republican institutions by force of arms.

The same document indicates that:

"The supporter is any person who gives assistance to the main enemy". Here again, the subsidiary enemy can be a supporter, but not ethnic. He is a political being as he may be a Rwandan or a foreigner.

It is very strange that the interpretation of those definitions by René Degni Segui led to conclusions diametrically opposed to the meaning intended by the FAR General Staff. How did the Special Rapporteur fail to understand that the good interpretation of the terms in that document and their application would have instead prevented ethnic cleavages in Rwanda?

It is evident that the conclusion reached by René Degni Segui regarding the FAR document about the enemy is deliberately biased. Thus, the Special Rapporteur intentionally omits mentioning an important point that would have elucidated the meaning of the definition given by the FAR General Staff.

In the same document, the Chief of Staff states:

"Political opponents who wish to gain power or effect peaceful, democratic change of the present political regime in Rwanda should not be confused with the ENI or its supporters.

This last point amply demonstrates that the military document neither targetted the Tutsi group nor the leaders of the political opposition.

4. Inexistence of "Tutsi genocide" in Rwanda

The Special Rapporteur vigorously affirms that "Tutsi genocide" took place in Rwanda, as a result of the massacres, because the three constituent elements defining the crime of genocide were met.

Those three conditions are summed up as follows:

- a. A criminal act;
- b. "the intent ...to destroy, in whole or in part";
- c. "a particular group as such"

By analyzing those factors, one reaches the same conclusion as René Degni Segui that there was no doubt about the first condition in the light of the massacres that were perpetrated in Rwanda.

But, contrary to the views of the Special Rapporteur, the second condition is difficult to meet, since it was demonstrated that those massacres had not been Programmed.

The third condition equally poses problems as long as the Tutsi ethnic group was not targetted as such.

Criminal acts were committed in Rwanda without any intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi group. What happened in Rwanda cannot be qualified as "Tutsi genocide", but rather as "interethnic massacres", as shown above.

5. Identification of the perpetrators of the massacres by René Degni Segui

René Degni Segui's report fails to specify who, in the Rwandan Government and in the RPF, pursued the policy that led to the Rwandan tragedy. He merely cites, without any proof, the following agents:

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- Rwandan State organs;
- political parties;
- RTLM;
- The militia, notably, the *Interahamwe*; and
- RPF organs.

The accusations levied against those agents are either incomplete or unfounded, as shown hereunder:

5.1 State organs

The State organs concerned are those responsible mainly for national security and sovereignty, meaning the government as a whole and its specialized departments as shown in table 2.

5.1.1 The Government

The Coalition Government led by Mrs. Agathe UWILINGIYIMANA could not have conceived genocide without the International Community getting wind of it. As shown in Table 1, the structure of this Government was so heterogeneous that it could not have reached a consensus on such a grave matter as the planning of "genocide", whereas the scheme was against the Tutsi members of that same Government.

5.1.2 Reduced Cabinet

Table 2 equally shows the heterogeneity of the Cabinet in which the Presidential tendency held the Ministries of Defence and the Interior; while the radical opposition held key posts such as, the Prime Ministry, National security, the Ministries of Justice, Information, Finance and Foreign Affairs.

It is this divergence that renders it impossible to have planned the massacres.

Table N° 1

Composition of the Coalition Government as of 6 April 1994

N°	Post	Incumbent	Political Party		C.P.R. or FPR		Remarks
			M.P.	OIR	Pro.	Anti	
1.	President of the Republic	Habyarimana	MRND			x	1
2.	Prime Minister	Uwilingiyimana		MDR	x		2
3.	Interior Minister	Munyazesa	MRND			x	3
4.	Min. of Foreign Affairs	Gasana		MDR	x		3
5.	Defense	Bizimana	MRND			x	3
6.	Justice	Ntamabyariro		PL		x	4
7.	Information	Rucogoza		MDR	x		2
8.	Finance	Rugenera		PSD	x		5
9.	Public Works	-		PSD			-
10.	Agriculture	Nza urambaho		PSD	x		2
11.	Primary & Secondary Education	Mbonimpa		MDR	x		5
12.	Planning	Ngirabatware	MRND			x	4
13.	Health	Bizimungu	MRND			x	4
14.	Labour	Mugiraneza	MRND			x	4
15.	Youth	Nzabonimana	MRND			x	4
16.	Gender	Nyiramahuko	MRND			x	4
17.	Higher Education	Mbangura	MRND			x	4
18.	Commerce	Mugenzi		PL		x	4
19.	Environment	Ruhumaliza		PDC		x	4
20.	Social Affairs	Ndasingwa		PL	x		2
21.	Ministry of Transport & Communication	Ntagerura	MRND			x	4

Notes:

1. Killed on 6 April 1994
 2. Killed on 7 April 1994
 3. Was on mission abroad
 4. Took immediate refuge at the French Embassy
 5. Took refuge in the RPF Zone
- M.P. : Presidential Alliance: These are Ministers from the Political Parties who supported the President of the Republic.
- O.I.R. : Radical Interior Opposition: These are Ministers from Opposition Parties opposed to the President of the Republic.
- C.P.R. : Political Tendency with regard to RPF.

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Table N° 2

Cabinet Causus responsible of National Security as of 6 April 1994

N°	Post	Incumbent	Political Party		C.P.R. or FPR		Remarks
			M.P.	OIR	Pro.	Anti	
1.	President of the Republic:						
	1. President	Habyarimana	MRND			x	1
	2. Director General	Ruhigira	MRND			x	6
	3. Political Affairs	Renzaho	MRND			x	1
	4. Judicial Affairs	Munyemana	MRND			x	3
5. External Relations	Runyinya	MRND			x	3	
2.	Prime Minister's Office:						
	1. Prime Minister	Uwilingiyimana		MDR	x		2
	2. National Security	Iyamuremye		PSD	x		4
3. Adviser on Defense & Security	Nshizirungu		MDR	x		4	
3.	Ministries:						
	1. Interior	Munyazesa	MRND			x	3
	2. Defense	Bizimana	MRND			x	3
	3. Justice	Ntamabyariro		PL	x	x	7
	4. Information	Rucogoza		MDR	x		2
	5. Foreign Affairs	Gasana		MDR	x		3
6. Finance	Rugenera		PSD			5	
4.	Public Services:						
	1. Chief Prosecutor's Office	Nkubito			x		6
	2. Constitutional Court	Nsanuwera <i>Frans</i>			x		4
	3. Information office	Kavaruganda <i>Joe</i>			x		2
	4. Army General Staff	Higiro <i>Joan Muneza</i>			x		6
5. Gendarmerie General Staff	Gen. Nsabimana				x	1	
		Gen. Ndingiliyimana				x	7

*ate Prosentor
pro Kigali*

Notes:

1. Killed on 6 April 1994
 2. Killed on 7 April 1994.
 3. Was on mission abroad.
 4. Took immediate refuge in the RPF Zone.
 5. Took immediate refuge in the Government Zone.
 6. Took refuge abroad.
 7. Was in Kigali.
- ****
 Set up from 16 July 1993
 M.P. : Presidential Alliance.
 O.I.R. : Radical Interior Opposition.
 C.P.R. : Political Tendency with regard to RPF.

5.1.2.1 Ministry of Defence

Analysis of Table 3 reveals that the Ministry of Defence was already undermined: three members of Cabinet out of seven were pro-RPF. The same goes for 2 of the three commanders of the Military Academies (*Ecole Supérieure Militaire and Ecole des Sous-Officiers*). This alone suffices to show that the genocide could neither have been planned nor executed at the level of the Ministry of Defence.

Let us suppose that that the plan really did exist, its execution with effect from 6 April 1994 would have been made impossible by:

- a. the absence of Minister of Defence;
- b. the assassination of the Chief of Army Staff;
- c. the absence of the Chief of Army Intelligence at the Army Headquarters;
- d. the absence of the Chief of Military operations at the Army Headquarters.

Contrary to allegations expertly orchestrated by the RPF and its sponsors, the Chiefs of the Rwandan Army did not all hail from the same region. All the 11 *préfectures* in the country were represented, as shown in Table 3b.

Even though apolitical, the Rwandan Army could not have been the instrument of genocide, because it must have come under the influence by political cleavages based on regional or ethnic identity. Political awareness in the Army was expressed through the military chiefs and in relation to the RPF. Table 3b shows that all the military chiefs did not favour the republican trend. That is why there is reason to think that if the "Tutsi genocide" had been planned within the Armed Forces, the pro-RPF and would have got wind of the plan and divulged and even denounced it.

No such thing happened.

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Table 3a

Ministry of Defence [Administration] as of 6 April 1994

N°	Post	Incumbent	Prefecture of Origin	C.P.R. or FPR		Remarks
				Pro.	Anti	
1.	<u>Minister's Office:</u>					
	1. Minister	Bizimana	Byumba		x	2
	2. Cabinet Director	Col. Bagozora	Gisenyi		x	3
	3. External Security	Col. Rutayisire	Gikongoro		x	3
	4. Technical Adviser	Col. Ndegeyinka	Kibuye	x		3
	5. Administration	Col. Ndirwami	Gisenyi	x		3
	6. Finances	Lt. Col. Kayumba	Byumba		x	3
7. War Council	Maj. Cyiza	Cyangugu	x		3	
2.	<u>Army General Staff:</u>					
	1. Chief of Staff	Gen. Nsabimana	Ruhenger.		x	1
	2. Administration	Col. Murasampongo	Gitarama		x	3
	3. Intelligence	Col. Ntwiragabo	Gisenyi		x	2
	4. Operations	Col. Kabiligi	Cyangugu		x	2
5. Logistics	Col. Rwamanywa	Gikongoro		x	3	
3.	<u>Gendarmerie:</u>					
	1. Chief of Staff	Gen. Ndirilyimana	Butare		x	3
	2. Administration	Maj. Gakara	Byumba		x	3
	3. Intelligence	Maj. Karangwa	Gitarama		x	3
	4. Operations	Lt. Col. Rwarakabije	Ruhenger.		x	3
5. Logistics	Maj. Nzanzimfura	Kigali		x	3	
4.	<u>Military Schools:</u>					
	1. ESM*	Col. Rusatira	Ruhenger.	x		3
	2. ESO*	Col. Gatsinzi	Kigali	x		3
	3. EGENA*	Maj. Kanimba	Gikongoro		x	3

Notes:

1. Killed on 6 April 1994
2. Was on mission abroad.
- 3: Was in the office
- * ESM: Higher Military Academy
- * ESO: Non-Commissioned Officers School
- * EGENA: National/Gendarmerie School

Table 3b

Ministry of Defence [Unit Commanders] as of 6 April 1994

N°	Post	Incumbent	Prefecture of Origin	C.P.R. or FPR	
				Pro.	Anti
1.	<u>Rwandan Army:</u>				
	1. Kigali Ville	Col. Muberuka	Kigali		x
	2. Mutara	Lt. Col. Nkundiye	Gisenyi		x
	3. Butare	Col. Gatsinzi	Kigali	x	
	4. Rulindo	Lt. Col. Sebahire	Kibungo		x
	5. Gisenyi	Lt. Col. Nsengiyumva	Gisenyi		x
	6. Rubengeri	Col. Bizimungu	Byumba		x
	7. Byumba	Lt. Col. Bahufite	Byumba		x
	8. Kibungo	Lt. Col. Nkuliye Kubona	Byumba		x
9. Bugesera	Lt. Col. Munyarugarama	Ruhengeri		x	
2.	<u>Independent Units:</u>				
	1. Parachute Battalion	Maj. Ntabakuze	Gisenyi		x
	2. Recce Battalion	Maj. Nzuwonemeye	Kigali		x
	3. G.P. Battalion	Maj. Mpiranya	Gisenyi		x
	4. M.P. Battalion	Maj. Bararwerekana	Ruhengeri		x
	5. Air Base	Lt. Col. Ndahimana	Kibuye		x
	6. Air Combat Wing	Col. Kanyamanza	Ruhengeri		x
	7. A.C. Battalion	Maj. Mutabera	Gisenyi		x
	8. LAA Battalion	Lt. Col. Hakizimana	Gisenyi		x
9. C.E. Codo	Lt. Col. Nzangize	Butare		x	
3.	<u>Gendarmerie Groups:</u>				
	1. Kigali	Col. Nyirimanzi	Ruhengeri		x
	2. Nyanza	Capt. Birikunzira	Gitarama		x
	3. Butare	Maj. Habyarabatuma	Gikongoro	x	
	4. Gikongoro	Maj. Mpatswe	Kigali		x
	5. Cyangugu	Lt. Munyarugerero	Gisenyi		x
	6. Kibuye	Maj. Jabo	Gikongoro		x
	7. Gisenyi	Maj. Biganiro	Ruhengeri		x
	8. Rubengeri	Maj. Kanimba	Gikongoro		x
	9. Byumba	Lt. Bahembera	Ruhengeri		x
	10. Rwamagana	Maj. Havugiyaremye	Butare		x
	<u>Specialised Units:</u>				
	1. Mobile Wing	Lt. Col. Nzapfakurumisi	Kibuye		x
2. Intervention Group	Maj. Murangira	Kigali		x	
3. Records Company	Capt. Kayihura	Cyangugu	x		

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5.1.2.2 Ministry of the Interior

As shown in Table 4, the political divergences existing between the most high-ranking officials in that Ministry made it impossible for that Department to plan the Tutsi genocide. Thus, it must be noted that those divergences were much more marked at the base than at the summit owing to ethnic, political, regional and even socio-economic cleavages, as many communes had just designated their officials through multi-party elections.

5.1.2.3 Ministries of Information, Justice, Finance and Foreign Affairs

Planning the execution of the massacres could not be effected without means furnished by these four Ministries heavily controlled by the radical opposition. Anastase GASANA and Marc RUGENERA, erstwhile Ministers from the radical opposition, and today Ministers in the RPF Government did not reveal any plan for genocide.

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Table 4

Senior Officials of the Interior Ministry as of 6 April 1994

N°	Post	Incumbent	Political Party		C.P.R. or FPR	
			M.P.	OIR	Pro.	Anti
1.	Cabinet Ministers:					
	1. Minister	Munyazesa	MRND			x
	2. Director of Cabinet	Kahimanzira	MRND			x
	3. Director General	Ngendabimana	MRND			x
2.	Préfets:					
	Préfecture:					
	1. Kigali Ville	Col. Renzaho	-	-		x
	2. Kigali Rural	Karera	MRND			x
	3. Gitega	Uwizeye		MDR	x	
	4. Butare	Habyarimana		FL		x
	5. Cyangugu	Bagambiki	MRND			x
	6. Gikongoro	Bucyibaruta	MRND			
	7. Kibuye	Kayishema		PDC		
	8. Gisururi	Banyurwabuke		MDR		
	9. Ruhengeri	Baliyanga		MDR		
	10. Byumba	Nyirimbibi	CDR			
11. Kibungo	Ruzindana		PSD			

Notes:

- M.P. : Presidential Alliance
OIR : Radical Opposition within Rwanda
CPR : Similar Political Tendency as the RPF.

5.2 Political Parties

The major divergence between the interests of the five coalition parties in Government, is reason for one to surmise that together, those parties could not reach any consensus whatsoever on as delicate and macabre a subject as planning a genocide.

So, besides the ideological and/or political considerations separating the MRND from the four other parties of the radical opposition, cohesion between the leaders of those trends was far from being feasible as shown in Table 5.

None of the five political parties could, going it alone, monopolize power. None of them could influence the course of the history of Rwanda negatively and secretly, by planning and prosecuting the genocide.

Even if the MRND had wanted to, it could not, for the following reasons:

- a. The sponsors of the radical opposition and especially the RPF already put the MRND on a hot seat: the Belgian Government and the American Administration. Therefore, it was under constant surveillance by the Embassies of the two countries, which would have prevented genocide by all means.
- b. The MRND no longer had control over the entire State apparatus, as the opposition held key posts such as: National Security, Justice, Information and the Office of the Prime Minister.
- c. That party, the motto of which was PEACE, UNITY and DEVELOPMENT, which ruled the country for 18 years, and which had many Tutsi members and supporters, had no reason to plan the extermination of its members, from an ethnic group representing 10% of the national electorate. Even if the MRND wanted. President HABYARIMANA would have prevented it.

Table 5

Composition of the Executive Committees of Government Coalition parties as of 06 April 1994:

N°	Party	Position	Name	Political Party		C.P.R. or FPR	
				M.P.	OIR	Pro.	Anti
1.	MRND	1. Chairman	Nzirumpatse	MRND			x
		2. Vice-Chairman	Karemura	MRND			x
		3. Vice-Chairman	Kabagema	MRND			x
		4. National Secretary	Nzirorera	MRND			x
2.	MDR	1. Chairman	Twagirumungu		MDR	x	
		2. Vice-Chairman	Nsengiyaremye		MDR		x
		3. Vice-Chairman	Karamira		MDR		x
		4. Executive Secretary	Murego		MDR		x
3.	PSD	1. Chairman	Nzamarurubaho		PSD	x	
		2. Vice-Chairman	Ngango		PSD	x	
		3. Executive Secretary	Gafaranga		PSD	x	
4.	PL	1. Chairman	Mugenzi		PL		x
		2. Vice-Chairman	Ndasigwa		PL	x	
		3. Vice-Chairman	Mbonampeka		PL		x
		4. Executive Secretary	Ntamabyariro		PL		x
5.	PDC	1. Chairman	Nayinzira		PDC	x	
		2. Adviser	Kabanda		PDC		x
		3. Adviser	Ruhumuliza		PDC		x

Notes:

1. : Participated in the formation of the Interim Government;
2. : Security ensured by FAR;
3. : Security ensured by UNAMIR;
4. : Was killed
5. : Put himself under RPF protection;

Committees set up at the inception of each political party:

M.P. : Presidential Alliance

OIR: Radical Opposition within Rwanda

CPR: Similar Political Tendency as the RPF.

5.3 The RTLM Ltd.

5.3.1 What is RTLM Ltd?

Contrary to the general belief, RTLM is not a radio station. It is a privately owned limited liability company, for the installation and operation of a radio, a television and other services pertaining to information.

The RTLM Ltd. was designed as a private limited liability commercial concern. Its objective was to fructifying the capital invested by its shareholders, by marketing a fairly competitive media product to meet the expectations of a public that had enough of the hangover and the lack of creativity displayed by the public media.

The most remarkable feature of RTLM Ltd. is the diversity of its shareholders. It was founded on 8 April 1993 and Clément KABALIRA, a Tutsi, notarized its Statutes.

The first radio channel that went into service in late October 1993 was approved by the Minister of Information, Mr. RUCOGOZA, a pro-RPF Hutu in the opposition.

The objective of the RTLM Ltd. radio was to gather, process and disseminate information within the scope of the laws in force, while abiding with professional ethics and the code of conduct for journalists.

In comparison with Radio-Rwanda, the RTLM radio enjoyed more freedom in the collection, processing and dissemination of facts. It was also freer in its commentaries; which had the effect of dropping a bomb on the media landscape Prevailing at the end of 1993.

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This major innovation made the radio of the RTL M Ltd. a big success with the public, and incurred the dire hatred of the RPF and its allies, whose activities were always denounced by the journalists of that station who will later become pet aversions and men to be killed.

The Special Rapporteur and other detractors of the RTL M Ltd. radio station affirm that the station was at the root of the Rwandan tragedy, for:

- a. having dealt with issues as delicate as:
 - the ethnic problem in Rwanda;
 - the Arusha peace Accords;
 - the performances of the Belgian blue helmets.
- b. having launched appeals for ethnic hatred and violence.
- c. Having appealed for the exodus of the Hutus.

As shown in the following paragraphs, those three accusations arise from a biased analysis of the socio-economic situation prevailing in Rwanda since the beginning of the war triggered by the RPF on 1 October 1990.

5.3.2 Organization of radio debates over RTL M

If the RTL M Ltd. radio had treated issues as delicate as those enumerated above, it was in response to public preoccupations and expectations.

Those issues were topical at the time and could not escape the microphones of journalists of a radio station with the primary objective of informing its listeners objectively and honestly. Consequently:

- a. Organizing a radio debate on an ethnic problem with the aim of finding a lasting solution does not denote Hutu extremism as the RPF and its allies make people believe.

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- b. **Discussing the Arusha Accords, highlighting its loopholes, casting doubt on their very applicability, do not constitute a crime in the field of communication in a country that claims to be democratic.**
- c. **Denouncing the strange behaviour of certain Belgian blue helmets over the RTLM radio station is not tantamount to appealing for the murder of the Belgians.**
- d. **Putting to question the seriousness of General Dallaire for allowing discipline to erode among his troops, especially the Belgians, or for failing to publish the results of the investigations that had gone on for months, and this is not even considered a venial sin in a democratic system intent on remaining so.**
- e. **Reminding listeners that the population is still awaiting the results of investigations conducted by General Dallaire is not tantamount to committing anathema.**

5.3.3 Calls for ethnic hatred and violence

The assassination of President HABYARIMANA and the immediate resumption of hostilities by the RPF put the population in disarray. The population of Kigali, the capital, immediately left the city. Faced with this situation, some patriots quickly formed a resistance movement.

The RTLM radio station, like other services, promptly turned into an instrument for combat, for centralizing and disseminating information received from the population and other international media.

In this capacity, the radio station got down to:

- Denouncing the enemy's manoeuvres,**
- Boosting the morale of the resistance fighters,**
- Denouncing the crimes already committed by the RPF.**

It was not the RTLM broadcasts that originated the Rwandan tragedy. Neither the Special Rapporteur nor the International Community nor anybody has the right to assert that the killings started as a result of the appeal made by this radio station, as there had been a succession of inter-ethnic massacres from 1959 to 1992, well before the founding of that station.

5.3.4 The exodus

In the face of the RPF advance, aware of their atrocities and after the assassination of four bishops and ten catholic priests in Byimana, Gitarama, what other message could that radio station with truly patriotic broadcasters convey to the population?

Furthermore, no one can prove that the people went on exile because of the appeals made by that radio station, for the following two reasons:

- a. The Hutu population in the regions that radio station could not reach were not spared the exodus.
- b. Sequel to the barbaric attacks by the RPF, well before the inception of that radio station, the population of Ruhengeri and Byumba had already fled from the RPF advance.

In conclusion, it is worthy of note that neither the broadcasters nor the founders of RTLM Ltd. are liable for the massacres that plunged Rwanda into mourning.

Réné Degni Segui failed to specify the extent of responsibility imputable to the founders of RTLM Ltd., a duly constituted limited liability company. Moreover, the fact of creating a limited liability company cannot constitute a criminal act on the part of its founders.

5.4 The Interahamwe

5.4.1 The inexistence of Militia in Rwanda

The Special Rapporteur denounced the existence of political party militia in Rwanda. He then goes on to accuse the "militia" unjustly, especially the *Interahamwe* of being implicated in the planning and prosecution of the "Tutsi genocide".

Militia being defined, *inter alia*, as an organization of armed civilians; no political party created its own militia within Rwanda. The following six points illustrate the inexistence of Militia in Rwanda:

- a. Until 1991, the MRND controlled one State apparatus. Till then, no youth, no youth organization, was affiliated to that great single party.

- b. After June 1991, the radical opposition political parties within the country were first to create youth wings which took names like:
- *The Jeunesse Démocratique Rwandaise (JDR – Inkuba – Foudres)*: MRND
 - *Abakombozi (libérateur)*: PSD
 - *Jeunesse Libérale*: Parti Libéral
- c. The MRND that had already had a popular base for the past 15 years was the last party to create (before the CDR: *Coalition pour la Défense de la République*) its own youth wing. When the *Interahamwe* was created, it comprised Hutu and Tutsi youths and was had always been led by young Robert KAJUGA, a Tutsi.
- d. Until 1992, the MRND government had never allowed the existence of any armed opposition within the country. So no militia from the radical opposition parties were tolerated.
- e. From April 1992, once the radical opposition entered the government, they would not have tolerated the existence of militia within the MRND party.
- f. Since the beginning of the war (1 October 1990) and the formation of the Coalition Government, western diplomats accredited to Kigali keenly followed what was done in the country. It is therefore amazing that they never denounced the existence of party militia; if perchance they existed!

5.4.2 Abusive use of the term *Interahamwe*

The Special Rapporteur construes the term *Interahamwe* as “those who attack together”. This shows that René Degni Segui did not consult a Kinyarwanda-French dictionary or a neutral person knowledgeable in the Rwandan language and culture. He got himself taken in by the distortion and misinformation ploy used by the RPF to influence public opinion.

Interahamwe is a Rwandan term composed from *intera*, which means “step” or “walk” and *hamwe*, which means “together”. *Interahamwe* thus means “step together” or “walk together”. Taken as a noun, *interahamwe* means “those who walk together”.

In Rwandan culture, that noun is used to signify men decided to walk together to accomplish good deeds for the benefit of the society. Never can it be used to denote the contrary.

When René Degni Segui holds that the term *interahamwe* signifies "those who attack together", he does not realize that the equivalent for this French expression in Kinyarwanda is "*iterahamwe*" [note the absence of 'n' in that word].

The RPF simply took advantage of the ignorance of non-Kinyarwanda speakers who tend to omit certain letters from words without knowing the import, to give the impression that *iterahame* and *interahamwe* were synonyms, which is not true.

Moreover, as shown in Table 6, the meaning of the term *Interahamwe* underwent a social and political evolution in Rwanda.

Table 6

Evolution of the term "*Interahamwe*"

Initially	28 May 1992 (Creation of FDC)	6 April 1994	After July 1994
MRND party youth comprising Hutus, Tutsis and Twas	Pro- Habyarimana Rwandans	Rwandans opposed to the RPF taking over power	All the Hutus All the foreigners or Tutsis denouncing RPF extremism

The Special Rapporteur accuses the *Interahamwe* of planning and executing the massacres throughout the national territory, but fails to specify the category of *Interahamwe*, which is being blamed. Hence, we could infer, without fear of contradiction, that René Degni Segui does not know what he is talking about.

6. The real perpetrators and those really responsible for the inter-ethnic massacres

6.1 The real perpetrators of inter-ethnic massacres

The Table below shows the evolution of political and ethnic cleavages since the RPF invasion in October 1990. It shows that those who initiated the civil war in Rwanda are members of two groups called "*Inyenzi*" and "*Interahamwe*".

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Table 7 Evolution of political and ethnic cleavages in Rwanda

October 90	June 91	March 92	May 92	July 93	Nov. 93	April 94
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
RPF	RPF	RPF	RPF FDC	RPF OIR	Pro-RPF Trend	<i>Inyenzi</i> (vernacular for pro-RPF trend)
MRND	Renovate d MRND	MRND CDR OIR	MRND CDR	MRND CDR OIR**	Republican trend	<i>Interahamwe</i> (to denote republican trend)

Observations

1. Invasion of Rwanda by a category of Tutsis called: RPF
At this level the RPF comprises a category of Tutsis
The MRND comprises Rwandans within the country: Hutus, Tutsis and Twas.
2. Adoption of multi-party politics
At this stage, The renovated MRND comprises several Hutus, some Tutsis and Twas.

Some Hutus and Tutsis break off from the MRND and form opposition parties: The MDR, PSD, PL and PDC, commonly known as the radical opposition within the country (OIR).
3. Certain Hutus of the MRND party and the radical opposition within the country created the CDR.
The OIR: The radical opposition within the country comprises the following parties: MDR, PL, PSD, PDC.
4. The parties in the radical opposition within the country (OIR) unite in a political trend that is similar to the RPF's: the *Forces Démocratique pour le Changement* (FDC).
5. Split in FDC, ethnic division within the radical opposition parties within the country.

Birth of two trends: Pro-RPF radical opposition within the country (OIR*) and the Republican Radical Opposition within the country (OIR**)
8. Formation of two antagonistic political tendencies: the Pro-RPF trend and the republican trend.

9. ***Inyenzi***: A vernacular term used to designate the pro-RPF trend. By extension, that term is used today to designate even foreigners who are supporting the RPF.

Interahamwe: A vernacular term used to designate the republican trend. By extension, that term is also applies to any person who no longer wishes to collaborate with the RPF, even if he is a foreigner.

It is the *Inyenzi* and the *Interahamwe* who, by their conflict, are indistinguishably at the origin of the Rwandan civil war.

6.2 Those truly responsible for the massacres

The massacres in Rwanda are a result of ethnic divisions that have been highlighted in Table 7 so the real culprits are individuals or bodies corporate who were responsible for the policy that led to the ethnic cleavage.

And the ethnic cleavage should not have occurred if:

- a. A group of Tutsi exiles united under the RPF had not invaded Rwanda, killing the Hutu civilian population.
- b. The war, initiated and sustained by the RPF, had not lead to the displacement of over one million members of the rural population with their belongings.
- c. Certain Tutsis in the country had not sent out their sons to join the ranks of the RPF.
- d. The Burundian Army made up solely of Tutsis had not foully murdered Melchoir Ndadaye, the first democratically elected Hutu President.
- e. The RPF had not conducted selective assassinations of Hutu leaders like:
 - Emmanuel GOPYISI (MRND)
 - Fidèle RWAMBUKA (MRND)
 - Félicien GATABAZI (PSD)
 - Martin BUCYANA (CDR).
- f. President HABYARIMANA had not been assassinated.

It emerges from this analysis that contrary to widespread belief, the inter-ethnic massacres, intentionally confounded with the "Tutsi genocide", were not conducted

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by the MRND *Interahamwe*. They were rather sparked off by the political and ethnic cleavages caused by the war waged and sustained by the RPF since 1 October 1990.

CONCLUSION

In paragraph 64 of his report, the Special Rapporteur concludes, and rightly so:

"It is against this background that the attack on the presidential aircraft must be examined by the Special Rapporteur, to determine any links between those who ordered it and those responsible for the massacres. The "interim Government" including the Prime Minister, and of 10 Belgian soldiers, must also be ascertained. The links between the political party militias, particularly the *Interakamwe*, the Presidential Guard, the Rwandese Armed Forces and the *gendarmerie*, must also be investigated in order to determine the chains of command and individual responsibility. On the basis of that investigation, the Special Rapporteur will be in a position to make appropriate recommendations to the Commission on Human Rights."

No such thing was done: no investigation into President HABYARIMANA's assassination, no enquiry into the circumstances surrounding the assassination of the moderates in the Cabinet and the killing of 10 Belgian soldiers; nor were the links between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the militia looked into.

As this assertion highlights the weakness of this report, which not only remains incomplete on all counts, the assertions and recommendations contained therein should be manipulated with a lot of precautions.

That is why we have shown throughout our presentation that:

1. During the period under review by René Degni Segui, there was neither "Tutsi genocide" nor any "genocide" at all in Rwanda. There were inter-ethnic massacres during the civil war that followed the assassination of President HABYARIMANA and the resumption of military hostilities by the RPF.
2. Utilization of the term "genocide" to designate inter-ethnic massacres was adopted by the RPF in order to get sympathy and enlist the assistance of the International Community.

The expression "Tutsi genocide" became the main weapon of the Kigali Government, to enable it justify its conquest of power by force of arms. The expression is also exploited by the RPF to stop the Tutsi criminals from being bothered by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

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The expression "Tutsi genocide" is used by the Tutsis as goodwill of which the RPF is availing itself to violate the legal principle based on presumption of innocence until proven guilty, regarding all the Hutus considered as genocide perpetrators, even before standing trial.

Acceptance of this situation has allowed for the diabolization of all Hutu refugees, especially the cadres.

3. Inter-ethnic massacres that followed President HABYARIMANA's death were not planned. They ensued from the ethnic cleavages generated by the murderous attacks launched by the RPF over a period of 4 years against a civil population in disarray.

To render justice to an unjustly accused people, the following three actions must be undertaken immediately:

1. Since President HABYARIMANA's assassination detonated the massacres, an international inquiry is called for to determine the responsibility of each of the accused parties. All those opposing such a move or are indifferent are to be considered as those who commissioned that assassination.
2. The host countries with Hutu refugees that were abused by the RPF and manipulated by its western allies should review their policy towards the Hutu refugees and rather strive to seek a lasting solution for Rwanda.
3. The term "Tutsi genocide" which is used as capital by the RPF, should be reconsidered and cease being used to diabolize an entire people.