The International responsibility of States and the UN for the breach of the obligation to prevent and suppress genocide and its legal consequences vis-à-vis the victims of genocide

Posted: January 31, 2011 in Evidence Material
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By Stephen Ruvebana

Research context

On 6 April 1994, the airplane of the Rwandan president exploded in the skies above Kigali. Belgian peacekeepers reported seeing two rockets fired toward his plane from the vicinity of a camp belonging to the Rwandan Presidential Guard and army commandos. Within hours of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard, the army, the Interahamwe, and the Impuzamugambi mounted roadblocks and killings spread quickly throughout the whole county, ordered and commanded by the Government through its army, Gendarmerie, militias, and individuals.

Ever since the so-called revolution of 1959 has happened, there had been propaganda against the Tutsi population. It increased in 1990 with the invasion of the RPF. The propaganda against Tutsis increased much more in the 1993 by the “Radio-television Libre de Milles Collines” (RTLM) whose shareholders included the President Habyarimana as the largest one.[1] This Radio began broadcasting shortly before the signing ceremony of Arusha Accords between the then government and the Rwandese Patriotic front. Some other weekly newspapers like Kangura supported by the government and military figures carried open hate-propaganda against Tutsis. It had published in 1990 the famous ten Hutu commandments which were instructions to mistreat and discriminate Tutsis, and later in December 1993, the same Kangura newspaper, predicted that President Habyarimana would be assassinated not by a Tutsi but by a Hutu.[2]

The international community was early informed by some reliable persons such as the Special Raporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions in March 1993. He reported that genocide against Tutsi population was being prepared.[3] Furthermore, four months prior to the real beginning of the massacres, on 11 January 1994, the commander of United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, sent a coded cable to the Peacekeeping Operations department of the Secretariat warning of a plan for the extermination of the Tutsi population.[4] Dallaire mentioned that he suspected that the lists of Tutsis which were established were for their extermination.  An example he gave was that in twenty minutes the personnel of President Juvenal Habyarimana could kill up to a thousand Tutsis.[5] He also reported that arms had been stockpiled in secret locations including pistols, rifles, a half million machetes and hundreds and thousands of hoes, axes, hammers and razor blades. Documents prove that the machetes came from China, supplied between 1992 and 1994 by a company called Oriental Machinery.[6] By the time the genocide began, 85 tons of munitions are thought to have been distributed, one machete being given to every third adult Hutu male.[7] These arms were the ones which were used to exterminate Tutsi four months later.

When the genocide began, an operation named ‘amaryllis’ was launched French government had decided to fly in a well-equipped armed force of paratroopers Operation Amaryllis with the sole objective of evacuating French their people from Rwanda, namely French and other westerners, members of Habyarimana’s family as well as the orphans of the Saint Agathe orphanage sponsored by the wife of the head of State. This orphanage had a specialty of receiving orphans of Rwandan army soldiers killed in combat.

At that time, the number of the UN peacekeeping force was 2548, and General Dallaire made a request of reinforcement of UNAMIR to put an end to the genocide which would require the Security Council to give him the enforcement power under Chapter VII of the Charter to stop the genocide and to increase the number of UNAMIR troops, but the SC decided against it.[8] Instead, the Security Council, at the urging of the United States,[9] decided in the Resolution 912 of 21 April 1994,[10] to withdraw 90 percent of the UNAMIR troops, and the remaining 270 were to be used only for the evacuation of foreigners and to act as intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreements.[11] Some of those foreigners have been evacuated by French, Italian and Belgian soldiers,[12] leaving Rwandans who were hiding with them to their fate.

After ten of Belgian troops had been killed by the Rwandan army, but before the reduction of the UNAMIR troops by the Security Council, the Belgian government decided to pull out his 450 troops from UNAMIR and Rwanda. By that time, ninety of the Belgian soldiers commanded by Lieutenant Luc Lemaire were at “Ecole Technique Officielle” of Kicukiro in Kigali.[13] In this school, there were more than two thousands people who had fled the killings from 8 April. They sought the protection from the Belgians, that they got until 11 April, when, at 13. 45 p.m, the last Belgian soldier pulled out.[14] This Belgian contingent abandoned those people, knowing that the place was surrounded by Hutu extremists, waiting for their departure to kill all those unarmed refugees who,[15] before the departure of those Belgian troops, had begged them to shoot them, rather than to be hacked to death later by the extremist Hutu militias.[16] They were telling them that a bullet was preferable than being cut to pieces with machete, hammers, knives and spears.[17] These people were immediately exterminated after the departure of the Belgians.

General Dallaire sought the UN to ask the US to shut down the radio RTLM which was a direct instrument of genocide. But after a study of the request by the Pentagon, it was recommended against, because of the cost -$ 8.500 an hour for a jamming aircraft over the country, and the legal argument that jamming a national radio station would violate international law principle of sovereignty of States.[18]

Schabas mentioned that, with a proper mandate, the United Nations peacekeeping forces could have prevented genocide in Rwanda. General Dallaire claimed that with an appropriately equipped force of 5,000 soldiers he could have stopped the Genocide.[19] This assessment was also confirmed by United States military experts.[20]

As a result of the plan and perpetration of the Genocide by the Government of Rwanda, and of the absence of any international military action to prevent or stop it, one million lives were lost in only one hundred days before it was stopped by the Rebellion Movement: the Rwandese Patriotic Front (R.P.F). It is the fastest and most vicious genocide yet recorded in human history.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then UN Secretary General challenged the Security Council, saying it was afraid to use the word ‘‘genocide’’ in presidential statements and resolution because this would require it to prevent the crime being committed.[21] Kofi Annan went to Rwanda in 1998 to acknowledge that the international community and the UN failed Rwanda at the time of evil.[22]

The US and Belgium later presented their mea culpa acknowledging their failure to do something to prevent or stop that tragedy. Indeed, in 1998 President Clinton visited Rwanda, and he issued something of an apology. He said: “We in the United States and the world community did not do as much as we could have done to try to limit what occurred. It may seem strange to you here, but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror”.[23] The Belgian Prime Minister did also apologize first in 2000 and in 2004 for the second time. He acknowledged that Belgian conduct caused the loss of many human lives.[24]

The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda was taken in this introduction as an example but it is not the only genocide that has happened up to now. For instance in Bosnia it happened and similarly to what happened in Rwanda, while the genocide in Srebrenica was taking place, the Dutch peacekeeping troops failed to stop the massacre of more than 8,000 men and boys at Srebrenica .The Dutch troops were in the Balkans as part of the UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR, to shield civilians during the bloody wars that pitted Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Croats and Muslims. This peacekeeping force at Srebrenica, which was composed of nearly 400 men, was meant to protect the refugees and residents of that Bosnian town, designated a safe haven by the UN in 1993. However, they offered little or no resistance to the Serb attack.[25]

The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda as well as that of Srebrenica and some other genocides happened while the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide and other international legal instruments were in force. Yet, as it was later stressed by the ICJ, this Genocide Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose since its object was on the one hand to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality.[26] It is in this context that this convention imposed to all contracting parties, the obligation to prevent genocide. In explaining the scope of this convention and particularly its article I, the ICJ clarified that “Article I does impose distinct obligations over and above those imposed by other Articles of the Convention. In particular, the Contracting Parties have a direct obligation to prevent genocide”.[27]

However, while this Genocide Convention imposes the obligation on contracting parties the direct obligation to prevent genocide it did not provide mechanisms to implement this obligation. In fact, this Genocide Convention was adopted three years after the adoption of the UN Charter. Article 2(4) of this UN Charter states that: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”[28]

One year after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 375 (1949) on the right and duties of states in which it is stated that: “Every state has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of any other state…”[29] A similar provision was included in Resolution 2131(1965) on the inadmissibility of intervention: “No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state”.[30]

The UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970) on Friendly Relations followed and repeated article 2(4) but also prohibited the intervention in internal affairs by stating that: “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State ….are in violation of international law”.[31] This was confirmed by the ICJ in Nicaragua case: “The principle forbids all states or groups of states to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other states.”[32] This leads to the main question in this work as formulated in the next list of questions.

 

Main question

What does the obligation to prevent and suppress genocide entails to States and the UN and what are the legal consequences of its breach vis-à-vis the victims of genocide, under international law ?

To find answers to this main question a number of sub questions will need to get answers. Those are:

 

–                           To whom does a sovereign State owe the duty to protect its people against genocide?  Does the duty to prevent genocide imply the duty not to commit genocide?

–                           Does international law allow States to take military action to save people against whom genocide is being prepared or committed?

–                           What actions not implying the use of force, are permitted or required in international law for States to prevent genocide in another State in order to comply with their duty to prevent genocide?

–                           Can the responsibility of third states be established when their acts and/or omission to prevent genocide cause damage to the population against which a genocide is committed?

–                           Who can invoke the responsibility of the state which commits genocide and/or the state which did not comply with the obligation to prevent and before which court?

–                           Does the UN (Security Council) have any duty to prevent and/or suppress genocide under international law?

–                           Can the responsibility of the UN be established when the acts and/or omissions by the UN Security Council and UN peace-keepers cause damage to the population against which a genocide is committed?

–                           Who can invoke the liability of the UN and before which court? And what are the mechanisms for mise–en-oeuvre?

–                           What might be the best form of preventing genocide in the future?

 

 

Interest in this work

These questions arise on the basis of the sad experiences in some places in the world. In different places, there have been plans by states to destroy people on the ground of race, ethnicity, religion or nationality. This is a crime of crimes which shocks the human conscience. Thus, it is worth investigating the role of international law in attempts to efficiently prevent this crime. It is in this context that these questions were formulated and if answers to them can be provided it will contribute to the advancement of international law as far as the prevention and suppression of genocide are concerned. This work will help to establish whether or not States and/or international organizations can be held responsible for the omission to prevent/suppress genocide. This investigation aims therefore at contributing to avoid such tragedies in the future and to bring justice to the victims of mass violations of human rights. More clearly, this work is undertaken for the purpose of promoting the cause of humanity in general and the human rights in particular.

 

Subdivision of the work and the Methodology

In searching for legal answers to these questions, this work has been divided in 5 chapters.  The first chapter will examine the meaning and scope of relevant legal provisions on the prevention and suppression of genocide.

While the second chapter will examine the responsibility of States for the commission of genocide and for the breach of the obligation to prevent genocide, the third chapter will investigate the responsibility of international organizations, in particular the UN.

In investigating the responsibility of states and International Organizations, the aim is not only to know who is responsible for the crime of genocide, but also whether international law contains a right of reparation that can be exercised by victims of that genocide. The legal issues on the reparation as well as the invocation of the responsibility before the Court and the enforcement of Court’s decisions will be dealt with in chapter four.

Finally, recognizing the crucial weight of the prevention of genocide in the whole work, chapter five will propose mechanisms for future and better prevention of genocide. Those mechanisms are either those not implying the use of force or those implying it.

As far as the methodology is concerned, in this research the appropriate method is the analysis through legal materials. Indeed, in order to know the scope of the Genocide Convention as far as the prevention and suppression of genocide is concerned, an analysis of that convention as well as other related legal materials will be investigated in order to know the ‘ratio legis’ of the Genocide Convention.

And in order to investigate on the establishment of the responsibility of States and the UN, it will be necessary to analyze International treaties in relation with this field as well as customary international law as regards with the possibility for a state to comply with its obligation to prevent and /or suppress genocide. Case-laws will be used to know how those International Legal Instruments have been interpreted and applied by Courts. More specifically, the case Serbia-Montenegro v. Bosnia-Herzegovina will occupy the most important place since the Court ruled on many legal questions about the application of the Genocide Convention.

 

 

Research plan

Topic: The International responsibility of States and the UN for the breach of the obligation to prevent and suppress genocide and its legal consequences vis-à-vis the victims of genocide.

 

Introduction

 

Chapter 1: The obligation to prevent and suppress genocide under International Law.

 

1.1. Origin and definition of genocide.

1.2: The scope of the convention with regards to the prevention and suppression of the Crime of Genocide

1.2.1. Meaning and scope of article I

1.2.2. Preventive actions not implying the Use of force

1.2.3. Preventive actions implying the use of force

1.2.3.1. Intervention by a state in another state to prevent genocide: a right or an obligation under the genocide convention?

1.2.3.2 The prohibition of use of force, the principle of non-intervention v. the duty to prevent genocide 

1.2.3.3. Humanitarian intervention: a means for the prevention of genocide? 

1.2.3.4. Potential legal justification: humanitarian intervention towards the responsibility to protect.

1.3. The meaning and scope of article VIII of the Genocide Convention.

 

Completion: From September 2009 –SEPT 2010

Chapter 2. State responsibility for the breach of the obligation to prevent/suppress genocide

2.1. State obligation not to commit genocide vs. the obligation to prevent it

2.1.1. The State obligation not to commit genocide

2.1.1.1. The state responsibility for commiting genocide agaisnt its population

2.1.1.2  The state responsibility for committing genocide beyond its territory

2.1.1.3. The state responsibility for Aid or assistance in the Genocide

 

2.2. State responsibility for breach of the obligation to prevent genocide

2.2.1 The number of victims required for a state to take measures in conformity of its duty to prevent

2.2. 2. Permitted states’ legal mechanisms to prevent genocide

2.3. The obligation to prevent genocide vis-à-vis some practical cases

2.3.1. Serbia-Montenegro in Srebrenica

2.3.2. The Netherlands in Srebrenica

2.3.3.  Belgium in Rwanda

2.3.4. France in Rwanda

2.3.5 Other countries

 

2..4. The justiciability of State in case of Genocide

2.4.1. Who can invoke the responsibility of a state which committed genocide against its own population?

2.4.2. Who can invoke the responsibility of a state which committed genocide outside its territory?

2.4.3. Who can invoke the responsibility of a state for the breach of its obligation to prevent genocide?

 

Completion: From September 2010- September 2011

Chapter 3. The responsibility of International Organizations for the breach of the obligation to prevent Genocide

3.1. Responsibility of International Organizations under International law

3.2. The UN and the Genocide Convention

3.3. The relationship between the Genocide Convention and the UN Charter

3.3.1. Article I of The Genocide Convention and art 2(4) of the UN charter

4.3.2. Article VIII of the Genocide Convention and article 39 and 42 of the UN Charter

3.3.3 Does the UN have an implicit obligation to prevent/suppress genocide under the Genocide Convention?

 

3.4. The responsibility of the UN for its acts or omission and acts and omission by UN Forces during genocide.

3.4.1. Acts and omissions by the United Nations through the SC during genocide 

3.4.2. The acts and omissions of UN forces operating in a State during genocide

 

3.5. The notion of “non-assistance d’une personne en peril” in International Law

3.5.1. Definition of the principle

3.5.2. The “non-assistance d’une personne en peril” in Romano-gemanic law family

3.5.3. The “non-assistance d’une personne en peril” in Common law

3.5.4. Is the principle  recognized as a general principle of law?

3.5.5 . Is the principle recognized as a rule of customary law?

 

3.6. The Justiciability of the United Nations

 

Completion: From September 2011- September 2012

Chapter 4. Reparation for victims of genocide as consequence to the breach of the obligation to prevent

 

4. 1      Notion and modes of reparation in international law

4. 2      Reparation to victims of gross and systematic violations: quantitative aspect of victims

4.3.      The reparation by the state responsible for genocide

4.4.      The reparation by state responsible for the breach of the duty to prevent/suppress genocide

4.5       Reparation by the United Nations. Which Court is competent and who can sue the UN?

4. 6      Proposed adequate modes for reparation of gross and systematic violations of human Rights

 

Chapter 5.  Mechanisms for better prevention of genocide in future

5.1. Mechanisms not implying force

5.1.1. Anti-eliminationism mechanisms (Find and use the book on : Genocide, worse than war)

5.1.2. The reinforcement of International human rights instruments (amendment of genocide convention, charter….)

5.1.3. The anti-genocide educational program in all schools

5.1.4. Improvement of the life of citizens and raise their intellectual capacity

5.1.4. Creation of an Anti-genocide strong body under the UN and at national levels and reporting system

– Developing and putting in place early warning capability and plans to act effectively

5.1.5. Creation of a fund to make the prevention of genocide possible and effective

5.1.5. The reinforcement of the role of the ICC in the prevention by punishing: branches in each region of high risk

5.1.6. The reglementation and reinforcement of the principle of universal jurisdiction in case of genocide (an international convention regulating this)

 

5.1.6. The reinforcement of the role of the ICJ (if not competent for UN then create a court on this)

5.1.7. Creation and enforcement of a strong compensatory mechanism for victims of genocide

 

5.2. Mechanisms related and/or implying force

5.2. 1. Enhancing the UN bodies with the capabilities to forcibly prevent genocide

5.2.2. The Humanitarian intervention as a principle of last resort but in right time

5.2.3. A strong UN mechanism of sanctions against the non- respect of the limits of humanitarian intervention

5.2.4. Enhancing and supevising regional bodies for a prompt and effective intervention to prevent genocide

 

Conclusion

Completion: From September 2012 – September 2013

 

Literatures:

 

I.             Legal Instruments

 

  1. Charter of the United Nations of June 26, at WWW < http://www.un.org>, (Consulted 09 July, 2009)
  2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260(III)A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948, at WWW < http://www.un.org> (consulted 12 July 2009).
  3. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001), at WWW < http://www.un.org&gt;, (Consulted 14 September 2009)
  4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, UNTS Vol. 999, p. 171.
  5. Statute of the International Court of Justice of 26 June 1945, UNCIO vol.15, p. 355.
  6. Statute of the International Criminal Court, at WWW < http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm>, (Consulted 26 June 2007).
  7. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at WWW < http://www.ictr.org/> (Consulted 20 September 2009).
  8. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 23, 1969, at WWW < http://www.un.org/> (Consulted 20 September 2009).
  9. Loi no 1867-06-08/01 du 8 Juin 1867 portant code penal Belge telle que modifiee en ce jour, publiee le 9 Juin 1867 et entree en vigueur le 15 Octobre 1867.
  10. Loi Belge no 1993-06-16/36 du 16 Juin 1993 telle que modifiee en ce jour, relative a la repression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire, Publie en Belgique le 05-08-1993 et entrée en vigueur le 15-08-1993.
  11. Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, at WWW <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/771/25/PDF/N9577125.pdf?OpenElement> (consulted on 15 September 2009).
  12. Security Council Resolution 692 of 20 May 1991, at WWW <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm > (Consulted 26 July 2009).
  13. Security Council resolution 812 of March 12, 1993, at WWW< http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/146/16/IMG/N9314616.pdf?OpenElement> (Consulted 18 September 2009).
  14. Security Council Resolution 872 of October 5, 1993, at WWW <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/771/25/PDF/N9577125.pdf?OpenElement> (consulted on 20 September 2009).
  15. Security Council Resolution 912 of April 21, 1994, at WWW <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/771/25/PDF/N9577125.pdf?OpenElement> (consulted on 20 September 2009).
  16. Security Council Resolution 918 of May 17, 1994, at WWW <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/771/25/PDF/N9577125.pdf?OpenElement> (consulted on 20 September 2009).
  17. Security Council Resolution 929 (1994) “Rwanda” (22 June 1994), at WWW <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/260/27/PDF/N9426027.pdf?OpenElement> (consulted on 22 September 2009).
  18. Security Council Resolution 955(1994) “Rwanda”, (9 November 1994) at WWW <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/260/27/PDF/N9426027.pdf?OpenElement> (Consulted 20 September 2009).
  19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217 A(III) of 10 December 1948, at WWW < http://www.un.org/> (Consulted 20 October 2009).
  20. UN G.A Resolution 96(I) of11 December 1946 on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
  21. UN General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V) “Uniting for peace” (3 November 1950), in T.M.C ASSER INSTITUUT,  Elementair Internationaal Recht, T.M.C ASSER PRESS, 2005, p. 205.
  22. UN General Assembly res. 2625, 24 October 1970 on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN, in T.M.C ASSER INSTITUUT,  Elementair Internationaal Recht, T.M.C ASSER PRESS, Den Haag,  2005, p. 94.

 


[1] Melvern, L., A people betrayed: the role of the west in Rwanda’s Genocide,  2nd ed, Zed Books, London and New York, 2000, p. 71

[2] Idem, p. 72

[3] Schabas, W A., Genocide in International Law: the Crimes of Crimes, Cambridge University Press , Cambridge,  p. 22

[4] Idem,  p. 475

[5] Ibidem

[6]Melven, L., op.cit. p. 64, 65.

[7] Ibidem

[8] Kenneth J. C., Genocide and the Global Village, Palgrave, New York, 2001, p. 78.

[9] Ibidem

[10] Security Council Resolution 912 of April 21, 1994, at WWW <http://www.un.org&gt;

[11] Kenneth J. C., op.cit., p. 78.

[12] Heidenrich G. J., How to prevent Genocide: A guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and Concerned Citizen, Westport, Connecticut London: Praeger, 2001, p.199

[13] Melvern, L., op.cit., p. 2.

[14] Idem, pp. 1-3.

[15] Ibidem

[16] Kenneth J. C., op.cit., p. 75.

[17] Melvern, L., op.cit., pp. 2, 4.

[18] Dallaire, R., Shake hands with the devil, the failure of humanity in Rwanda, Arrow Books, London, 2004, p. 375.

[19] Schabas W.A., Genocide in International Law: the Crimes of Crimes, Cambridge University Press , Cambridge, p. 475, p. 477

[20] Scott R. Feil, cited by Schabas W.A, Genocide in International Law: the Crimes of Crimes,  Cambridge University Press , Cambridge, p. 477

[21] Schabas W.A, op.cit. p. 477

[22] Barnett, M., Eyewitness to a genocide, the United Nations and Rwanda, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2002, p.154

[23] Power S., ‘‘A problem from hell’’: America and the Age of Genocide, Basic Books, New York, 2003, p. 386

[24] WWW <http://www.aidh.org/rwand/hirond03.htm>, (Consulted August 19 2009).

 

[25] Institute for War and Peace reporting,  Dutch Peacekeepers to return to Srebrenica, at WWW < http://iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o=325295&apc_state=henh>, (Consulted August  2009)

[26] Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23, quoted in International Court of Justice, Case concerning the application of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia- Montenegro), (Case No. 91) Judgment, 26 February 2007, para. 161.

[27] International Court of Justice, Case concerning the application of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia- Montenegro), (Case No. 91) Judgment, 26 February 2007, para. 162.

[28] Charter of the United Nations  of June 26,1945 at WWW, < http://www.un.org/>,(Consulted on 18 August 2009)

[29] UN General Assembly Resolution 375 (1949) of 6 December 1949 on the rights and duties of states at WWW < http://www.un.org>, (Consulted on 18 August 2009)

[30] UN General Assembly Resolution 2131(1965) of 21 December 1965 on the inadmissibility of intervention at WWW < http://www.un.org>,  (consulted, September 09, 2009)

[31] UN General Assembly res.2625, 24 October 1970 on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN, at WWW < http://www.un.org>, (Consulted, September 09, 2009)

[32] International Court of Justice, Case concerning the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, para 205, at WWW <http://www.icj-cij.org>, (Consulted, September 09, 2009)

 

 

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